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Spatial Competition in Milk Processing Industry 
 
Summary. 
A model of uniform spatial pricing with Löschian conduct as developeded by Alvarez et al. is 
tested for the milk processing industry in Germany. Results confirm some oligopsony power 
in this spatial markets and a low pass-through of a retail price change to the farm. 
Keywords: spatial competition, ologopsony, milk processing 
 
1. Introduction 
Rising concentration in food processing industries is evident in most countries. This might 
imply market power of processors as a seller of food products and/or as a buyer of agricultural 
raw products. While geographical markets for finished products are often relatively large, 
markets of some agricultural products are limited to a small geographical area because of high 
transportation costs. A good example might be raw milk which is usually not transported over 
long distances. Hence, concentration in milk processing might be a more serious problem for 
farmers than it might be for consumers.   
The aim of the paper is to answer the question whether milk processors are able to exert 
market power in a spatial market setting. We provide empirical results for two very different 
regions in Germany (Bavaria, Former Eastern Germany) and Germany as a whole. In Bavaria 
milk production is a very important source of farm revenues, though milk production units are 
quite small (around 30 cows per farm on average) and the density of milk processors is still 
high (average distance between processors is 28 kilomtres). In Former Eastern Germany milk 
production is less important, the average milk production unit has about 140 cows, and the 
average distance between milk processors ist about 55 kilomtres.    3
In the theoretical part in section 2 we repeat a duoply spatial competition model as 
developed by Alvarez et al (2000). However, we illustrate their model graphically and derive 
more intutive geometric areas of firms profits. In the empirical model in section 3, like in 
Alvarez et al. (2000), we estimate a reduced form model where the price paid to farmers is 
explained by distance, transportation costs, the price of milk at the consumer level and the 
number of relevant rivals. Section 4 represents the estimation results. 
 
2. Graphical  description  of  the Alvarez et al. model  
Alvarez et al. (2000) employ a spatial competition model with two processors, located in a 
fixed distance d on a linear, unbounded line. Processors have identical constant processing 
costs c (not including the raw material milk), and they get the same price p for processed 
milk. Thus, ρ = p-c is their gross margin. 
The two processors compete for the raw products produced by a continuum of farmers 
distributed along the line. Farmers supply curve x





The pricing scheme employed is UDP, i.e. the processors bear shipping costs. Shipping costs 
are linear in distance and quantity; t*r are the costs to transport one unit of raw material r 
miles. Thus, given ρ, t and u and neglecting competition, each processor chooses a market 
area as large as possible - without generating negative net margin, i.e.
1: 
 
(2)  ř (u)=(ρ-u)/t  
   4
Due to competition a processor might not obtain the total supply within this market 
area. Assuming that processors set the same purchaser price u and their market areas overlap, 
they share the supplied quantity 50:50 (in the overlapping region). 
To derive the equilibrium, an assumption has to be made about price reactions or market 
boundary reaction. Alvarez et al. (2000) assume Lösch competition, i.e. if one processor 
changes his UDP u, the competitor will react 1:1. With Lösch competition changes in own 
market area translate into synchronous changes in the market area of the competitor.  
Due to the fact, that both processors have to set the same price in equilibrium, there are 
three cases of an equilibrium: 
•  Local monopoly 
•  Plain overlapping of market areas in-between locations 
•  Spacious overlapping of market areas beyond competitors locations 
Figure 1- 3 depict the three cases; A and B mark the two processors locations and R*i 
the particular market boundary, i = A, B:  
While Alvarez et al. use integrals to describe processors profits for the three different 




Figure 4 depicts the processors' situation in the case of a local monopoly in two 
dimensions.
2 Profits are given by the gross margin (ρ = p - c) minus purchaser price u minus 
transportation cost (1/2*t*r where ½*t is the average transportation cost). This unit net profit 
is multiplies by the supply of a single farmer u times the number of farmers in the processors 
market r. In addition we have to multiply it by 2 because of the symmetric nature of the model 
(processor picks up milk to his left and right) 
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In both cases of overlapping markets – meagre or spacious – three zones have to be 
considered, i.e. there are three summands within the profit formula. For meagre overlapping, 
the zones can be described as follows: 









(d-r) is the width of this area and ½*(d-r)*t are the average shipping costs within this region. 





This time the width is 2*r-d (=r-(d-r)) and the average transportations costs are the 
transportation costs for the center of this region, i.e. at d/2. That is because the area spreads 
symmetrical around d/2 with a radius of r-d/2.To get the whole profit all three summands 
have to be added up. 
For the case of an overlapping of market areas beyond competitors’ locations profit 
again  consists of three summands: 
    First of all, there is no competition in the remote part of the backyard. 
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The width is d, and the center ½*(2*r-d).  




Here, width is r-d, and the center lies at ½*(r-d).  
   In-between locations, ‘competition land’ continues to exist all over the place. Thus, the 
own market share is ½.  ‘Competition land’ comes to an end at distance r, i.e. beyond 




Again, to get the whole profit all three summands have to be added up. 
For each case described above, the equilibrium price is the one maximizing the total 
profit. It is calculated by differentiating Π with respect to u; at u* the partial derivative 
diminishes and the second order condition is fulfilled, too.
3 
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 = Π ρ  7
•  If the distance is small
4, competition beyond locations emerges. Only 1/5 to 1/3 of the 
changes in the retail price p, expressed by changes in the gross margin ρ, will be 
transmitted to the purchaser price. 
•  In case of a medium distance – competition in-between locations
5 – price transmission is 
50  %  . And finally, in local monopoly price transmission again decreases to 1/3. All 
together, price transmission stays far below 100 % or 1, respectively. 
•  The equilibrium purchaser price schedule – expressed as a function of t*d – looks like the 
one shown in 7. 
Due to the formulas and chart 10 the essential findings from theory are: 
   Price transmission ∈ [1/5; ½] 
   Before reaching the local monopoly, the milk price schedule looks like a upside down 
hyperbole
6. This can be re-interpreted as: the milk price is a increasing function of t*d and 
a decreasing function of (d*t)
2. 
These findings are to be tested with data for the German milk processing industry. 
 
3. Empirical  Model 
Based on the theoretical model a reduced form model of the following form is estimated: 
 
(6)  k , j , i k , j , i 4 k , j 3
2
k , j , i 2 k , j , i 1 k j i k , j , i e N P S S u + + + + + + + = β β β β γ λ α . 
 
The price per litre paid to farmers ui,j,k by each firm i in each month j, in each year k is 
explained by Si,j,k, S
2
i,j,k, P,j,k, Ni,j,k, and three sets of dummies, where αi accounts for firm level 
fixed effects (i = 1, …, 183 for whole Germany),  λj for monthly differences (j = 1,…, 11) and 
γk for yearly differences (k = 1, … ,3). Si,j,k = Di,j,k*Fj,k is the empirical counterpart of s = t*d   8
and is calculated in the following way. Di,j,k is constructed as the sum of distances from firm i 
to its nearest rivals such that the combined volume of the rivals at least equalled the volume 
of firm i. We utilised price per litre Fj,k of diesel fuel to approximate shipping costs t. Since 
price changes with s as depicted in Figure 4 β1 is expected to have a positive sign while β2 is 
expected to have a negative sign. Pj,k, is the empirical counterpart of p. Since we lacked data 
on wholesale prices received by processors, Pj,k, represents the national average price per litre 
for bottled milk. Similar to Alvarez et al. we include Ni,j,k,  the number of rivals whose 
combined volume equals at least the volume of firm i.  
Data consisted of monthly observations of prices paid to farmers and milk quantities 
shipped to 183 milk processors (about 97% of all milk processors) between 1999 and 2003 as 
gatherd by the Zentrale Preis- und Marktberichtsstelle (ZMP).  
We run regressions for all processors in Germany as well as separately for two distinct 
areas. Bavaria is a very dense though small structured milk producing area. On average there 
are about 20 cows per hectare. Also milk processing is small structured with an average 
distance between milk processors of 28 kilometres. In contrast to Bavaria in former Eastern 
Germany milk production is less important (8 cows per hectare), but and milk processing 
firms are more widespread (55 kilometres). The average milk quantity a truck collects per 
stop is 414 litres in Bavaria and 2580 litre in former Eastern Germany. 
Table 1 presents statistical information for the data used for whole Germany. 
 
4. Results   
Regression (6) is carried out using fixed effects unweighted. OLS and weighted GLS 
estimation procedures in Eviews 3.1. The results for Bavaria, Eastern Germany and whole 
Germany are illustrated in Table 2 - 4. The results are similar for all three regions. S, S2, and 
P have the expected signs. However S
2 is much larger for Bavaria. The parameter of P is   9
about 0.38 implying imperfect price transmission between the consumer price and the price 
for raw milk. Only 38 % of changes of the consumer price are forwarded to farmers. 
For all three regressions coefficient connected to N (the number of competitors used to 
calculate d) has an unexpected sign. Intuition suggests an increase in u caused by a growing 
number of competitors.  
Looking at the dummies for January till November, milk price is above average from 
October till March and below average from April till September. A big milk supply during 
summer time-feeding and a small milk supply during winter time-feeding is likely to cause 
the seasonal changes. 
Dummies for the years 2001 and 2002 indicate, that the years both presented above 
average-milk prices. Most likely, they are the result of increased consumer demand due to 
BSE-crisis. 
   10
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Footnotes
                                                 
1 At the boundary ř the net margin diminishes, i.e. 0=ρ – u – t * ř. The interpretation of the 
expression ρ – u – t * ř is: gross margin – purchaser price – shipping costs. 
2 3-dimensional illustrations are provided in the Appendix. 
3 The partial derivative is of order two. Thus, there are two candidates for maximizing ￿, but 
only one of them fulfills the second order condition (second derivative negative). 
4 The lower line of the formula is the relevant one. 
5 The middle line of the formula has to be examined. 
6 A downward open hyperbole.   12
Appendix: 
Three-dimensional figure of local monopoly:  
At the x-axis, we see the distance d between the locations of the two milk processors. 
The y-axis is applied for all cost elements, as there are the milk price u and the shipping costs, 
and last but not least, the z-axis measures the milk quantity per spatial unit. All together, we 
quantify: milk quantity per spatial unit , market area and net margin 
The volume of the “wedge” is identical to profit. The product of the first factors 
measures the total quantity processed by a firm. Net margin is generated as difference of gross 












Three-dimensional figure of ‘overlapping in-between locations’: 
 
 
Chart 2: 3-dim. fugure of ‚overlapping in-between locations’ 
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Three-dimensional figure of ‘overlapping beyond competitors’ locations’: 
 
 
Chart 3: 3-dim figure of ‚overlapping beyond competitors’ location’ 
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Figure 3: overlapping beyond competitors’ locations 
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u* as function of t*d 

























d r −  18
 
Dairies in Germany (fiscal data in Cent)    
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum
U  32,12  2,33  26,92  40,26 
P  47,27  3,44  42,50  53,28 
N  1,90  1,57  1,00  10,00 
S  19,11  27,94  0,99  159,91 
Table 1: Statistical KPIs for regression variables     19
 
Dependent Variable: u 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 05/12/04   Time: 16:24 
Sample: 1999:01 2002:12 
Included observations: 48 
Number of cross-sections used: 62 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 2928 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
S 0.045540  0.007776 5.856210 0.0000
S2 -0.000152  4.52E-05 -3.366285 0.0008
N -0.371941  0.068814 -5.405004 0.0000
P 0.381202  0.006490 58.73243 0.0000
M1 0.360315  0.062616 5.754398 0.0000
M2 0.197969  0.062583 3.163315 0.0016
M3 0.284296  0.062683 4.535475 0.0000
M4 -0.228940  0.062448 -3.666074 0.0003
M5 -0.610849  0.062432 -9.784208 0.0000
M6 -0.445290  0.062417 -7.134133 0.0000
M7 -0.634787  0.062306 -10.18820 0.0000
M8 -0.412358  0.062282 -6.620860 0.0000
M9 -0.225386  0.062200 -3.623551 0.0003
M10 0.038896  0.062204 0.625295 0.5318
M11 0.116911  0.062227 1.878771 0.0604
Y00 1.847036  0.040033 46.13788 0.0000
Y01 2.293928  0.054793 41.86517 0.0000
Y02 -0.468459  0.052438 -8.933549 0.0000
Weighted Statistics         
R-squared  0.986528     Mean dependent var  34.88338
Adjusted R-squared  0.986154     S.D. dependent var  6.335428
S.E. of regression  0.745476     Sum squared resid  1582.730
F-statistic  12267.85     Durbin-Watson stat  0.779716
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
Unweighted Statistics         
R-squared  0.870248     Mean dependent var  32.57492
Adjusted R-squared  0.866648     S.D. dependent var  2.050583
S.E. of regression  0.748818     Sum squared resid  1596.956
Durbin-Watson stat  0.675999       
Table 2: Estimation results for Bavaria   20
 
Dependent Variable: u 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 05/12/04   Time: 16:31 
Sample: 1999:01 2002:12 
Included observations: 48 
Number of cross-sections used: 31 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1428 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
S 0.041839  0.013289 3.148290 0.0017
S2 -9.28E-05  4.15E-05 -2.235500 0.0255
N -0.806086  0.253155 -3.184163 0.0015
P 0.372491  0.015777 23.60934 0.0000
M1 -0.677506  0.151195 -4.481005 0.0000
M2 -0.902517  0.151089 -5.973399 0.0000
M3 -1.016175  0.151130 -6.723837 0.0000
M4 -1.587782  0.150397 -10.55729 0.0000
M5 -2.062136  0.150396 -13.71136 0.0000
M6 -1.783336  0.150161 -11.87616 0.0000
M7 -1.621106  0.149852 -10.81803 0.0000
M8 -1.089365  0.149702 -7.276872 0.0000
M9 -0.551893  0.149331 -3.695765 0.0002
M10 0.078521  0.149342 0.525784 0.5991
M11 0.397264  0.149405 2.658967 0.0079
Y00 1.840993  0.093003 19.79496 0.0000
Y01 2.339782  0.137877 16.97009 0.0000
Y02 -0.638136  0.134275 -4.752449 0.0000
Weighted Statistics         
R-squared  0.973168     Mean dependent var  33.77882
Adjusted R-squared  0.972234     S.D. dependent var  7.604790
S.E. of regression  1.267199     Sum squared resid  2214.388
Log likelihood  -2263.537     F-statistic  2942.034
Durbin-Watson stat  0.581174     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
Unweighted Statistics         
R-squared  0.727300     Mean dependent var  31.31627
Adjusted R-squared  0.717808     S.D. dependent var  2.403284
S.E. of regression  1.276667     Sum squared resid  2247.603
Durbin-Watson stat  0.550504       
Table 3: Estimation results for Eastern Germany   21
 
Dependent Variable: uI 
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights) 
Date: 05/12/04   Time: 16:39 
Sample: 1999:01 2002:12 
Included observations: 48 
Number of cross-sections used: 183 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 8508 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
S 0.015554  0.003859 4.030982 0.0001
S2 -2.07E-05  8.32E-06 -2.494073 0.0126
N -0.211091  0.059917 -3.523062 0.0004
P 0.376166  0.006702 56.13035 0.0000
M1 -0.516185  0.064169 -8.044171 0.0000
M2 -0.844820  0.064137 -13.17220 0.0000
M3 -0.991470  0.064292 -15.42129 0.0000
M4 -1.526173  0.064062 -23.82337 0.0000
M5 -1.913026  0.064008 -29.88739 0.0000
M6 -1.595975  0.064026 -24.92679 0.0000
M7 -1.432700  0.063919 -22.41415 0.0000
M8 -0.743115  0.063912 -11.62723 0.0000
M9 -0.043788  0.063857 -0.685728 0.4929
M10 0.573786  0.063860 8.985017 0.0000
M11 0.799541  0.063881 12.51610 0.0000
Y00 1.882268  0.038996 48.26879 0.0000
Y01 2.236613  0.055307 40.44018 0.0000
Y02 -0.620485  0.053978 -11.49510 0.0000
Weighted Statistics         
R-squared  0.976106     Mean dependent var  35.79299
Adjusted R-squared  0.975531     S.D. dependent var  8.837995
S.E. of regression  1.382494     Sum squared resid  15877.08
F-statistic  19962.07     Durbin-Watson stat  0.529454
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
Unweighted Statistics         
R-squared  0.708689     Mean dependent var  31.86682
Adjusted R-squared  0.701676     S.D. dependent var  2.590524
S.E. of regression  1.414921     Sum squared resid  16630.62
Durbin-Watson stat  0.467708       
Table 4: Estimation results for Germany 
 